European Union after Brexit

The political, economic and institutional context in which it will take place is particularly complex. Firstly, due to an exceptional circumstance that has occurred, the European and world crisis resulting from the Covid-19 pandemic, which will require focusing on what must be the priority objective: economic and social recovery. However, other endogenous factors must be added to this, since both Brexit and the health crisis come at a time when the Union was trying, once again, to get out of the "loop" which it has been stuck in since the great expansion in 2004, after the failure of the constitutional project in 2005, the financial crisis started in 2008 and finally the Brexit referendum in 2016, which have prevented any attempt to achieve new objectives. The effects of the pandemic now presage that the loop will continue.

The European Commission, which had a turbulent start with the failure of the Spitzenkandidaten's (lead candidates) political commitment, must seek to control the impact of these factors on the community institutional interplay. This will be no easy task for the new Commission, but it has an example to follow in the Brexit Negotiating Group led by Michel Barnier.

The loss of one of the big States has resulted in changes in the composition of the European Parliament. Furthermore, the 2019 elections have allowed the political forces that until now have governed the community institutional system from its origins (Christian Democrats, Socialists and Liberals) to continue to hold 60% of the seats in the chamber. But the European Parliament is not governed by rules of action which are as predictable as those of the Council, and experience shows that it "has a life of its own" and is not prepared to be considered as a silent partner in light of the decisions of the Council.

In the case of the Union's Council, the repercussions of Brexit are likely to be greater. This is due to variations in the computation of the majority, related to the percentage of the population, to adopt agreements or to obtain a blocking minority and its effects on the influence relations of each State. At this point, the German position is going to be equal to that of France, Italy or Spain, as any of these can achieve a blocking minority with two of the others as well as a fourth smaller state. On the other hand, Germany has lost the comfortable position that it had until now in matters related to the increase in community spending since, as it cannot take refuge in the British radical belligerent position, it must hold a more active and visible position. Groups of governments with homogeneous interests have also broken out: "The Visegrad Group", "The Frugals", "The Friends of Cohesion" and the "New Hanseatic League". The big ones - except for the case of Spain and for the cohesion - have remained on the sidelines of this interplay, in order to have greater freedom of movement.

The panorama described shows how awful it is going to be to manage the community decision-making system, designed more to slow down than to advance. The Commission can force unanimity in the Council; within the Council the larger states can obtain blocking minorities and Parliament responds to its own rules, which are not always easy to predict. To this effect, carrying out trilogues may be particularly useful.

In any case, it should not be forgotten that European integration is based on favouring the national interests of all its members, and that the community interest is not something alien and contrary to the national interest, but rather both are in an interdependent relationship. Although in moments of crisis the vision of reality is clouded, it should not be forgotten that we have to save ourselves together. The more than sixty years of European integration should have taught us this lesson which we have to remember in the face of the turbulent times ahead.

You can read the full article here: https://www.minsait.com/ideasfordemocracy/en/institutional-system-european-union-after-brexit-full-article